Safety and Sensitivity Conditions
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What is wrong with Henry's belief in the fake barn district is not that it is false, because it is true, and not that his eyes are failing, because they are working. What is wrong is that he came within a few metres of believing the same thing falsely. The defect is not in the actual world at all. It is in how close he came.
That observation, once made precise, produces the most technically developed response to the Gettier problem. Its instrument is the counterfactual conditional, and its result is two conditions that look like rewordings of each other and are not.
The apparatus
Definition
Counterfactual
A conditional whose antecedent is supposed for the sake of argument, typically contrary to fact, and which asserts that the consequent holds under that supposition. The standard semantics evaluates it by considering the most similar situations in which the antecedent is true.
Definition
Close possible world
A way things might have been that differs minimally from how they actually are. Modal epistemology uses closeness as a measure of how easily something could have happened: an outcome that occurs in a close world is one that could easily have occurred.
The semantics is due to Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis, and epistemology borrows it without needing the metaphysics that comes with it. Nothing in what follows requires that possible worlds exist. All that is required is that some ways things might have gone are nearer to how things actually went than others, which is a judgement people make constantly and with reasonable agreement.
Two features of the apparatus matter. Closeness is a matter of overall similarity rather than of any single dimension, so a world in which one small thing differs may be far away if the difference propagates. And the ordering is vague at the edges, which means every modal condition on knowledge inherits a vagueness it cannot eliminate.
Sensitivity
Definition
Sensitivity condition
The requirement that had the proposition been false, the believer would not have believed it. A belief meets the condition when it varies with the truth of what is believed.
Definition
Tracking account
Robert Nozick's analysis of knowledge, on which knowing requires that the belief be true, that it be sensitive, and that the believer would still believe it were it true but circumstances slightly different, all held fixed for the method actually used.
Nozick's idea is that a knower is a detector. What makes a smoke alarm a smoke alarm is that it goes off when there is smoke and stays quiet when there is not. The second half is the important one, and it is what sensitivity captures: a device that sounds continuously is not detecting anything, however often it is right.
The condition handles Gettier cases directly. Had it been false that the man who gets the job has ten coins, Smith would still have believed it, since his belief rests on the president's remark and the count of Jones's coins, neither of which would change. Smith's belief is insensitive, and so are Gettier beliefs generally, because the feature that makes them true is not the feature they are responsive to.
Nozick's fourth condition, called adherence, is needed because sensitivity alone is too weak. It requires that the belief stay in place across small variations in which the proposition remains true, so that a knower is stable as well as responsive.
The relativisation to method is also not optional. A grandmother sees her grandson is well. Had he been ill, the family would have kept him away and told her he was fine, so she would still have believed him well, and the belief looks insensitive. Nozick's answer is that the condition is evaluated holding fixed the method actually used, which here is seeing him. Holding vision fixed, had he been ill and she had looked, she would have seen it.
Check your understanding
What sensitivity costs
The condition's most notorious consequence is that it invalidates closure, and the next article is devoted to that. Its other well-known problem can be stated here.
Consider a belief that could not easily be false, but whose falsity would require a wildly different world. You believe you are not a brain in a vat. Had you been one, you would still have believed you were not. The belief is insensitive, so on Nozick's account you do not know it. Nozick accepted this, which is part of what makes the account interesting rather than merely defective, but many find the cost prohibitive.
Consider also beliefs formed by induction. You believe your chair will hold you. Had it been about to collapse, you would have believed it anyway, since nothing in your evidence would have differed. Sensitivity rules out a great deal of ordinary inductive knowledge, and the fixes have been strained.
Safety
Definition
Safety condition
The requirement that the believer could not easily have believed falsely. A belief is safe when in all or nearly all close worlds in which the believer forms that belief in the same way, the belief is true.
Safety, defended by Ernest Sosa and by Timothy Williamson, reverses the direction of the conditional. Sensitivity starts from the falsity of the proposition and asks about belief. Safety starts from the belief and asks about truth.
The reversal is not a logical equivalence. If not-p then not-believe-p is not equivalent to if believe-p then p, because counterfactuals do not contrapose. This is the whole of the technical difference between the two conditions, and every divergence between them traces back to it.
What safety buys is the two cases that sensitivity loses. Your belief that you are not a brain in a vat is safe, since envatment worlds are remote, so safety lets you know it and preserves closure. Your belief that the chair will hold is safe, since chairs in close worlds do not collapse.
What safety keeps is the fake barn verdict. Henry's belief is unsafe, because worlds in which he looks a hundred metres further down the road and forms the same belief falsely are as close as worlds can get.
Why the two conditions diverge
- Sensitivity asks whether, in the nearest worlds where p is false, the believer fails to believe p.
- Safety asks whether, in the nearest worlds where the believer believes p, p is true.
- When p is false only in remote worlds, the first question ranges over remote worlds and the second does not.
- When p is true but easily could have been believed falsely, the second question ranges over close worlds of error and the first need not.
- ∴The conditions come apart in both directions, and neither entails the other.
Check your understanding
Where safety struggles
Necessary truths are the standard difficulty. A proposition that could not be false is true in every world, so every belief in it is trivially safe, including a belief in a theorem arrived at by a botched proof or by consulting a magic eight ball. Safety issues no verdict where it is most needed, and the repairs involve either restricting the condition to contingent propositions, which is ad hoc, or refining it to range over the method's outputs rather than the proposition's truth, which is closer to reliabilism.
Lottery cases press from the other side. You hold one ticket in a million and believe it has lost, before the draw, on the basis of the odds. The belief is unsafe, since a world in which your ticket wins is close in the relevant sense, and safety therefore says you do not know. Most find this the right answer. But your belief that you will not be able to afford a house this year rests on the same probabilistic footing and seems like something you know, and no clean line separates the two.
Check your understanding
The scoreboard
Sensitivity explains the Gettier cases, the fake barns, and the intuition that a knower is a detector. It costs closure and most inductive knowledge.
Safety explains the Gettier cases and the fake barns, keeps closure, and keeps inductive knowledge. It costs the necessary truths and gives an uncomfortable treatment of lotteries.
Most of the field has gone with safety, and the reason is closure, which is where the argument goes next.
Objection
Both conditions are hostage to a notion of closeness that neither theory defines. Whether the fake barn world is close, whether the envatment world is remote, whether a losing lottery world is nearby: these are the judgements doing all the work, and they are read off the epistemic verdict we wanted in the first place. The theory says Henry lacks knowledge because the error world is close, and the error world is counted as close because we already thought Henry lacked knowledge. The apparatus is a restatement of the intuitions with worlds drawn in.
Reply
The circularity charge is the right worry and it is overstated as put.
Closeness is not read off epistemic verdicts. It is fixed by overall similarity of fact, and in most cases the judgement is independent of anything epistemic and is not seriously disputed. That a world in which a coin lands the other way is close, and a world with different laws of nature is not, is not a claim anyone reaches by consulting their intuitions about knowledge.
The charge has real force in the hard cases, where closeness and knowledge are contested together, and the lottery is the clearest example. There the theory is not delivering an independent verdict.
What the objection misses is that the apparatus earns its keep by making predictions across cases rather than by adjudicating any one. Once closeness is fixed for the fake barn case, the framework entails results elsewhere that were not put in by hand, including the divergence between the two conditions and the failure of closure under sensitivity. Nozick did not set out to deny closure; the condition forced it on him. A framework that generates unwanted consequences from independently motivated parts is doing more than restating what it was built from.
Next
The principle that Nozick's account has to abandon, why it looks undeniable, and what a theory gains by giving it up.
Further reading
- Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard University Press, 1981), chapter 3.
- Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Ernest Sosa, "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore", Philosophical Perspectives, volume 13 (1999), pages 141 to 153.
- Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005).
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Analysis of Knowledge", sections on modal conditions.
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