93 entries
Thinkers Index
Who the curriculum engages with, roughly chronological. The line under each name says what the person held, not what they are best known for. Dates are printed only where they are settled; a 'c.' means the scholarship is not agreed.
Plato
c. 428–348 BCEHeld that the objects of knowledge are eternal Forms, and that the sensible world only ever resembles them
- Universals and Particulars (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- Mathematical Platonism and Nominalism (Ontology, Intermediate, planned)
- Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion (Epistemology, Beginner)
- The JTB Analysis (Epistemology, Beginner)
- What Justification Is (Epistemology, Beginner)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Gettier Cases and Post-Gettier Repairs (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemic Value and the Swamping Problem (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Lottery, Preface, and the Threshold View of Belief (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Is Existence a Property? (Ontology, Beginner)
- Universals and Instances (Ontology, Beginner)
- What 'Exists' Means (Ontology, Beginner)
- Creation, Conservation, and Providence (Theism, Beginner)
- Death and the Afterlife (Theism, Intermediate)
- Moral Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
Aristotle
384–322 BCELocated form in particular substances rather than a separate realm, and built the first systematic logic and the first virtue ethics
- Categories of Being (Ontology, Intermediate, planned)
- Ontological Categories in Aristotle and Husserl (Ontology, Intermediate, planned)
- Virtue Ethics and Eudaimonia (Ethics, Intermediate, planned)
- Substance and Bundle Theories (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- Act, Potency, and the Four Causes (Metaphysics, Advanced, planned)
- The Regress Problem (Epistemology, Beginner)
- Consequences, Rules, and Character (Ethics, Beginner)
- Many-Valued Logics (Logic, Advanced)
- Temporal, Deontic, and Epistemic Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- What Metaphysics Asks (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Universals and Instances (Ontology, Beginner)
- Liberty, Equality, and Justice as Three Demands (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
- What Justice Requires (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
- Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom (Theism, Advanced)
- Grim Reaper Paradoxes and Causal Finitism (Theism, Advanced)
Augustine of Hippo
354–430Argued that evil is a privation rather than a substance, which set the shape of Christian theodicy for a thousand years
Boethius
c. 477–524Proposed that God's knowledge is timeless rather than foreknowledge, so it does not remove the contingency of future acts
Avicenna (Ibn Sina)
c. 980–1037Distinguished essence from existence and argued from contingent beings to a necessary existent
Anselm of Canterbury
c. 1033–1109Gave the first ontological argument: what exists in reality is greater than what exists in the understanding alone
Al-Ghazali
c. 1058–1111Pressed the kalam version of the cosmological argument and attacked the philosophers' claim that the world is eternal
Maimonides
1138–1204Held that positive claims about God's nature fail, so theological language works by negation
Thomas Aquinas
1225–1274Argued for God from motion, causation, contingency, gradation and governance, and held that God is simple, with no distinction between attributes
- Cosmological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Simplicity, Timelessness, and Impassibility (Theism, Advanced)
- Classical Theism Against Theistic Personalism (Theism, Advanced)
- Existential Inertia and Divine Conservation (Theism, Advanced)
- Act, Potency, and the Four Causes (Metaphysics, Advanced, planned)
- Essence, Existence, and the Real Distinction (Metaphysics, Advanced, planned)
- Doing, Allowing, and Double Effect (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- The Trolley Problem as a Diagnostic (Ethics, Beginner)
- Law and the Rule of Law (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
- Creation, Conservation, and Providence (Theism, Beginner)
- Faith and Reason (Theism, Beginner)
- How Arguments About God Work (Theism, Beginner)
- What God Is Claimed to Be (Theism, Beginner)
- Death and the Afterlife (Theism, Intermediate)
- Divine Attributes and Their Tensions (Theism, Intermediate)
- Miracles and Hume (Theism, Intermediate)
- Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom (Theism, Advanced)
- Religious Language (Theism, Advanced)
John Duns Scotus
c. 1266–1308Held that being is said univocally of God and creatures, and introduced haecceity as the principle of individuation
William of Ockham
c. 1287–1347Denied that universals exist outside the mind, treating them as names that apply to many particulars
Thomas Hobbes
1588–1679Argued that life without a sovereign is intolerable, so rational agents contract into absolute political authority
René Descartes
1596–1650Held that mind and body are distinct substances, and tried to rebuild knowledge from the one belief doubt cannot touch
- Substance and Property Dualism (Philosophy of Mind, Intermediate, planned)
- Skepticism, First Encounter (Epistemology, Beginner)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemic Closure and Its Denial (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Foundationalism, Coherentism, Infinitism (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Testimony and Disagreement (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Is Existence a Property? (Ontology, Beginner)
- Introspection and Its Limits (Philosophy of Mind, Beginner)
- The Mind-Body Problem Stated (Philosophy of Mind, Beginner)
- Creation, Conservation, and Providence (Theism, Beginner)
- Faith and Reason (Theism, Beginner)
- What God Is Claimed to Be (Theism, Beginner)
- Death and the Afterlife (Theism, Intermediate)
- Divine Attributes and Their Tensions (Theism, Intermediate)
- Ontological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Existential Inertia and Divine Conservation (Theism, Advanced)
- Modal Ontological Arguments and Their Parodies (Theism, Advanced)
- Skeptical Theism and Its Costs (Theism, Advanced)
Baruch Spinoza
1632–1677Held that there is exactly one substance, so thought and extension are two attributes of the same thing
John Locke
1632–1704Grounded personal identity in continuity of consciousness rather than soul or body, and derived property rights from labour
- Personal Identity (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- The Social Contract Tradition (Political Philosophy, Intermediate, planned)
- Toleration (Political Philosophy, Intermediate, planned)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Lottery, Preface, and the Threshold View of Belief (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Rights, Introduced (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
Blaise Pascal
1623–1662Argued that belief in God is the rational bet under uncertainty, shifting the question from evidence to decision
- Faith and Reason (Theism, Beginner)
- From Theory to Cases (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- What Justification Is (Epistemology, Beginner)
- Death and the Afterlife (Theism, Intermediate)
- Natural Explanations of Religious Belief (Theism, Intermediate)
- Pragmatic Arguments for Belief (Theism, Intermediate)
- The Problem of Evil (Theism, Intermediate)
- The Problem of Divine Hiddenness (Theism, Advanced)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1646–1716Held that everything has a sufficient reason, and that identity of indiscernibles rules out two things sharing every property
- Modality and Possible Worlds (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- Identity and Definite Descriptions (Logic, Intermediate)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Quantified Modal Logic and the Barcan Formulas (Logic, Advanced)
- Change and Identity Over Time (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- The Ship of Theseus (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Cosmological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Theodicies and Defences (Theism, Intermediate)
- The No-Best-World Problem (Theism, Advanced)
George Berkeley
1685–1753Denied that matter exists: to be is to be perceived, and physical objects are collections of ideas
Thomas Reid
1710–1796Held that some beliefs are properly basic, so demanding a proof of the external world misunderstands how justification works
David Hume
1711–1776Denied that we perceive necessary connection in causes, denied that ought follows from is, and denied that testimony can establish a miracle
- The Problem of Induction (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Theories of Causation (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- The Is-Ought Gap (Ethics, Intermediate, planned)
- Miracles and Hume (Theism, Intermediate)
- Sources: Perception, Memory, Testimony, Reason (Epistemology, Beginner)
- Bayesian Confidence and Credence, Introduced (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Testimony and Disagreement (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Confirmation Theory, Ravens, and Grue (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Descriptive and Normative Claims (Ethics, Beginner)
- Deductive and Inductive Support (Logic, Beginner)
- Causation, First Pass (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Faith and Reason (Theism, Beginner)
- How Arguments About God Work (Theism, Beginner)
- Cosmological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- The Problem of Evil (Theism, Intermediate)
- Design and Fine-Tuning Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Philosophy of Religion Beyond Monotheism (Theism, Advanced)
- Classical Theism Against Theistic Personalism (Theism, Advanced)
- Existential Inertia and Divine Conservation (Theism, Advanced)
- Draper's Argument from Pain and Pleasure (Theism, Advanced)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
1712–1778Held that legitimate authority comes from the general will, not from consent to be ruled by another
Immanuel Kant
1724–1804Grounded morality in a test of universalisability rather than consequences, and held that some substantive knowledge is a priori
- Kantian Deontology (Ethics, Intermediate, planned)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Ontological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Moral Status (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- Rights, Duties, and Going Beyond Duty (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Consequences, Rules, and Character (Ethics, Beginner)
- Is Existence a Property? (Ontology, Beginner)
- How Arguments About God Work (Theism, Beginner)
- Cosmological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Death and the Afterlife (Theism, Intermediate)
- Moral Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Modal Ontological Arguments and Their Parodies (Theism, Advanced)
- Religious Pluralism and Exclusivism (Theism, Advanced)
Jeremy Bentham
1748–1832Held that the right act maximises pleasure over pain, counting each person for one, and dismissed natural rights as rhetoric
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
1770–1831Held that categories of thought develop historically through their own contradictions rather than sitting fixed
Arthur Schopenhauer
1788–1860Held that the world as it is in itself is blind will, and that existence is therefore not worth the suffering it costs
John Stuart Mill
1806–1873Defended utilitarianism with higher and lower pleasures, and held that the only ground for coercing an adult is harm to others
- Utilitarianism and Its Objections (Ethics, Intermediate, planned)
- Liberty, Equality, and Justice as Three Demands (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
- Toleration (Political Philosophy, Intermediate, planned)
- Harm, Benefit, and Consent (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- Consequences, Rules, and Character (Ethics, Beginner)
- The Problem of Other Minds (Philosophy of Mind, Beginner)
- What God Is Claimed to Be (Theism, Beginner)
Søren Kierkegaard
1813–1855Held that faith is not the conclusion of an argument but a commitment made without one
Karl Marx
1818–1883Held that labour under capitalism alienates the worker from the product, the act, and other people, and that ideology makes this look natural
Charles Sanders Peirce
1839–1914Treated belief as a habit of action and truth as what inquiry would converge on in the long run
- Confirmation Theory, Ravens, and Grue (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Probability Logic and Uncertain Premises (Logic, Advanced)
- Deductive and Inductive Support (Logic, Beginner)
- Predicate Logic (Logic, Intermediate)
- The Sixteen Binary Connectives (Logic, Intermediate)
- Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem (Logic, Advanced)
- The Curry-Howard Correspondence (Logic, Advanced)
- Universals and Instances (Ontology, Beginner)
- Consciousness Versus Cognition (Philosophy of Mind, Beginner)
Friedrich Nietzsche
1844–1900Held that moral systems have histories and interests behind them, and that tracing those undercuts their claim to authority
Gottlob Frege
1848–1925Invented quantificational logic, separated sense from reference, and held that numbers are objects
- Predicate Logic (Logic, Intermediate)
- Neo-Fregean Abstraction (Ontology, Advanced, planned)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Basic Set Theory for Logicians (Logic, Intermediate)
- Is Existence a Property? (Ontology, Beginner)
- Ontological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
Alexius Meinong
1853–1920Held that there are objects that do not exist, so quantification and existence come apart
Franz Brentano
1838–1917Held that directedness at an object marks the mental off from the physical
Edmund Husserl
1859–1938Made the structure of experience itself the subject matter, bracketing the question of whether its objects exist
William James
1842–1910Held that where evidence is genuinely inconclusive and the choice is forced, belief may be settled on other grounds
- Faith and Reason (Theism, Beginner)
- Doing, Allowing, and Double Effect (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- From Theory to Cases (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- What Justification Is (Epistemology, Beginner)
- Accuracy-First Epistemology (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic (Logic, Advanced)
- Quantified Modal Logic and the Barcan Formulas (Logic, Advanced)
- Pragmatic Arguments for Belief (Theism, Intermediate)
- Religious Experience (Theism, Intermediate)
- Grim Reaper Paradoxes and Causal Finitism (Theism, Advanced)
- The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Theism, Advanced)
John Dewey
1859–1952Treated inquiry as problem-solving within a practice rather than the pursuit of certainty
Bertrand Russell
1872–1970Analysed definite descriptions as quantifier phrases, so 'the present King of France is bald' comes out false rather than meaningless
- Identity and Definite Descriptions (Logic, Intermediate)
- Fictional and Non-Existent Objects (Ontology, Intermediate, planned)
- Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion (Epistemology, Beginner)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Basic Set Theory for Logicians (Logic, Intermediate)
- The Sixteen Binary Connectives (Logic, Intermediate)
- Free Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- Relevance Logic and Paraconsistency (Logic, Advanced)
- Second-Order and Higher-Order Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- Existence and Non-Existence (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Is Existence a Property? (Ontology, Beginner)
- Sensation and Perception (Philosophy of Mind, Beginner)
- Cosmological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Ontological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
G. E. Moore
1873–1958Held that good is indefinable, and that any attempt to define it in natural terms commits a fallacy
- Realism, Anti-Realism, and the Metaethical Map (Ethics, Intermediate, planned)
- The Is-Ought Gap (Ethics, Intermediate, planned)
- Skepticism, First Encounter (Epistemology, Beginner)
- Epistemic Closure and Its Denial (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Safety and Sensitivity Conditions (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Knowledge-First Epistemology and Anti-Luminosity (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Temporal, Deontic, and Epistemic Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- Sensation and Perception (Philosophy of Mind, Beginner)
- The Probabilistic Problem of Evil (Theism, Advanced)
Ludwig Wittgenstein
1889–1951Held first that language pictures facts, later that meaning is use, and that a private inner language is impossible
Martin Heidegger
1889–1976Held that the question of what it is to be had been forgotten in favour of cataloguing what there is
Rudolf Carnap
1891–1970Distinguished questions internal to a linguistic framework from external questions about which framework to adopt, and held only the first have answers
- Carnap's Internal and External Questions (Ontology, Intermediate, planned)
- Metaontology and the Substantivity Dispute (Ontology, Advanced, planned)
- Inductive Logic and the Carnap Programme (Logic, Advanced)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- What 'Exists' Means (Ontology, Beginner)
Gilbert Ryle
1900–1976Held that dualism is a category mistake, and that mental terms describe dispositions to behave
Alfred Tarski
1901–1983Defined truth for a formal language in a stronger metalanguage, and showed no consistent language can define its own truth predicate
- Soundness and Completeness Proofs (Logic, Advanced)
- Computability, Decidability, and Church's Theorem (Logic, Advanced)
- Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems (Logic, Advanced)
- What Makes a Constant Logical? (Logic, Advanced)
- Many-Valued Logics (Logic, Advanced)
- Model Theory: Types, Quantifier Elimination, Categoricity (Logic, Advanced)
- Relevance Logic and Paraconsistency (Logic, Advanced)
- Undefinability and the Theories of Truth (Logic, Advanced)
Karl Popper
1902–1994Held that theories are never confirmed, only not yet refuted, so falsifiability marks science off from what imitates it
Frank Ramsey
1903–1930Showed that degrees of belief must satisfy the probability axioms on pain of accepting a set of bets that loses whatever happens
Carl Hempel
1905–1997Set out the paradox that a green leaf confirms 'all ravens are black', which any theory of confirmation has to answer
Kurt Gödel
1906–1978Proved that any consistent system strong enough for arithmetic contains truths it cannot prove, and cannot prove its own consistency
- Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems (Logic, Advanced)
- Soundness and Completeness, Informally (Logic, Intermediate)
- Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem (Logic, Advanced)
- Intuitionistic Logic and Kripke Semantics (Logic, Advanced)
- Provability Logic and Löb's Theorem (Logic, Advanced)
- Reverse Mathematics (Logic, Advanced)
- Soundness and Completeness Proofs (Logic, Advanced)
- Undefinability and the Theories of Truth (Logic, Advanced)
Hannah Arendt
1906–1975Held that politics is action among plural equals in public, not the administration of a population
Simone de Beauvoir
1908–1986Held that woman is constituted as the Other against which man is defined as the norm
W. V. O. Quine
1908–2000Rejected the analytic-synthetic distinction, held that theories face experience as wholes, and made ontological commitment a matter of what the bound variables must range over
- Quine's Criterion and 'On What There Is' (Ontology, Intermediate, planned)
- Carnap's Internal and External Questions (Ontology, Intermediate, planned)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemic Injustice (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- The Problem of Induction (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Confirmation Theory, Ravens, and Grue (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Free Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- What Makes a Constant Logical? (Logic, Advanced)
- Second-Order and Higher-Order Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- Essence and Accident (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Identity and Individuation (Ontology, Beginner)
- Ontological Commitment, Informally (Ontology, Beginner)
- What 'Exists' Means (Ontology, Beginner)
A. J. Ayer
1910–1989Held that a statement is meaningful only if verifiable or analytic, which made moral and theological claims expressions of attitude
Alan Turing
1912–1954Replaced the question whether a machine thinks with a question about whether its conversation is distinguishable from a person's
Wilfrid Sellars
1912–1989Attacked the given: experience cannot justify belief unless it already has conceptual content
Roderick Chisholm
1916–1999Defended an internalist account of justification and posed the problem of the criterion
Donald Davidson
1917–2003Held that mental events are physical events, though no strict law connects mental and physical descriptions
J. L. Mackie
1917–1981Argued that objective values would be metaphysically queer, so moral claims are systematically false
- Realism, Anti-Realism, and the Metaethical Map (Ethics, Intermediate, planned)
- The Problem of Evil (Theism, Intermediate)
- What Metaethics Asks (Ethics, Beginner)
- Pragmatic Arguments for Belief (Theism, Intermediate)
- Theodicies and Defences (Theism, Intermediate)
- Naturalism and Supernaturalism as Frameworks (Theism, Advanced)
P. F. Strawson
1919–2006Held that responsibility is grounded in the reactive attitudes, which no metaphysical thesis about determinism could dislodge
- Free Will and Determinism (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- The Problem of Induction (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Identity and Definite Descriptions (Logic, Intermediate)
- Free Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- Identity and Individuation (Ontology, Beginner)
G. E. M. Anscombe
1919–2001Held that moral obligation without a lawgiver is incoherent, and that ethics should return to the virtues
Philippa Foot
1920–2010Introduced the trolley case to separate killing from letting die, and grounded virtue in facts about human flourishing
John Rawls
1921–2002Held that principles of justice are the ones parties would choose behind a veil of ignorance, yielding equal liberty plus a difference principle
- Rawls: The Original Position and the Two Principles (Political Philosophy, Intermediate, planned)
- Public Reason and Legitimacy (Political Philosophy, Advanced, planned)
- From Theory to Cases (Applied Ethics, Beginner)
- Moral Intuitions and What to Do With Them (Ethics, Beginner)
- What Justice Requires (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
Thomas Kuhn
1922–1996Held that normal science proceeds within a paradigm and that paradigm shifts are not settled by evidence alone
Michael Dummett
1925–2011Argued from a use theory of meaning to intuitionistic logic, rejecting bivalence for undecidable statements
Michel Foucault
1926–1984Held that what counts as knowledge is shaped by power, and traced punishment from spectacle to discipline
Hilary Putnam
1926–2016Argued that meanings are not in the head, and later that reference cannot be fixed by theory alone
- Externalism About Content: Twin Earth and Burge (Philosophy of Mind, Intermediate, planned)
- Functionalism and Multiple Realizability (Philosophy of Mind, Intermediate, planned)
- Skepticism, First Encounter (Epistemology, Beginner)
- Epistemic Closure and Its Denial (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Knowledge-First Epistemology and Anti-Luminosity (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Computability, Decidability, and Church's Theorem (Logic, Advanced)
- Model Theory: Types, Quantifier Elimination, Categoricity (Logic, Advanced)
- Second-Order and Higher-Order Logic (Logic, Advanced)
Edmund Gettier
1927–2021Showed with two short cases that justified true belief can fail to be knowledge
- Gettier Cases and Post-Gettier Repairs (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- The JTB Analysis (Epistemology, Beginner)
- The Regress Problem (Epistemology, Beginner)
- Bayesian Confidence and Credence, Introduced (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemic Injustice (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Internalism versus Externalism (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Safety and Sensitivity Conditions (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Contextualism, Invariantism, and Pragmatic Encroachment (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Knowledge-First Epistemology and Anti-Luminosity (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Lottery, Preface, and the Threshold View of Belief (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Reformed Epistemology and Proper Function (Theism, Advanced)
Noam Chomsky
1928–Showed that the linguistic input a child receives underdetermines the grammar they acquire, which sank behaviourism about language
Bernard Williams
1929–2003Held that impartial moral theories demand that agents abandon the projects that give them reason to go on, and that luck reaches into moral assessment
Jaakko Hintikka
1929–2015Built the first systematic logic of knowledge and belief, and devised inductive systems that let a universal generalisation be confirmed at all
Judith Jarvis Thomson
1929–2020Argued that even granting the fetus a right to life, that right does not entail a right to use another person's body
Jürgen Habermas
1929–Grounds legitimacy in what could be agreed under conditions of undistorted discussion
John Searle
1932–Argued with the Chinese Room that symbol manipulation is not understanding, whatever the program does
Alvin Plantinga
1932–Held that belief in God can be properly basic, and that free will answers the logical problem of evil
- Reformed Epistemology and Proper Function (Theism, Advanced)
- Theodicies and Defences (Theism, Intermediate)
- Modal Ontological Arguments and Their Parodies (Theism, Advanced)
- Ontological Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- The Problem of Evil (Theism, Intermediate)
- Religious Experience (Theism, Intermediate)
- Bayesian Natural Theology (Theism, Advanced)
- Classical Theism Against Theistic Personalism (Theism, Advanced)
- Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom (Theism, Advanced)
- Religious Pluralism and Exclusivism (Theism, Advanced)
- Simplicity, Timelessness, and Impassibility (Theism, Advanced)
- Draper's Argument from Pain and Pleasure (Theism, Advanced)
- The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Theism, Advanced)
Amartya Sen
1933–Shifted the measure of justice from resources to what people are actually able to do and be
Richard Swinburne
1934–Argued that theism is a simpler hypothesis than its rivals and made the whole case in probabilistic form, with simplicity carrying the prior
- Bayesian Natural Theology (Theism, Advanced)
- Religious Experience (Theism, Intermediate)
- How Arguments About God Work (Theism, Beginner)
- Death and the Afterlife (Theism, Intermediate)
- Miracles and Hume (Theism, Intermediate)
- Classical Theism Against Theistic Personalism (Theism, Advanced)
- Naturalism and Supernaturalism as Frameworks (Theism, Advanced)
Jerry Fodor
1935–2017Held that thinking is computation over a language-like system of mental representations
Thomas Nagel
1937–Held that no physical account captures what it is like to be a bat, and that morality cannot be reduced to a view from nowhere
Robert Nozick
1938–2002Held that a distribution is just if it arose from just acquisition and transfer, so patterned principles require constant interference
- Nozick and Entitlement Theory (Political Philosophy, Intermediate, planned)
- Safety and Sensitivity Conditions (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemic Closure and Its Denial (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- What a State Is For (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
- What Justice Requires (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
Alvin Goldman
1938–Held that a belief is justified when the process producing it is reliable, whether or not the believer can say so
- Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemic Injustice (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Gettier Cases and Post-Gettier Repairs (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Internalism versus Externalism (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Epistemic Value and the Swamping Problem (Epistemology, Advanced)
- What a State Is For (Political Philosophy, Beginner)
T. M. Scanlon
1940–Held that an act is wrong if it violates a principle no one could reasonably reject
Saul Kripke
1940–2022Gave modal logic its possible-worlds semantics, and argued that names are rigid designators, which makes some necessary truths knowable only a posteriori
- Modal Logic: Possible Worlds Semantics (Logic, Intermediate)
- Essentialism and the Argument from Origins (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- A Priori and A Posteriori (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- The Normal Systems K, D, T, B, S4, S5 (Logic, Intermediate)
- Correspondence Theory (Logic, Advanced)
- Intuitionistic Logic and Kripke Semantics (Logic, Advanced)
- Non-Normal Modal Logics (Logic, Advanced)
- Quantified Modal Logic and the Barcan Formulas (Logic, Advanced)
- Undefinability and the Theories of Truth (Logic, Advanced)
- Essence and Accident (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Possibility and Necessity, Informally (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Modal Ontological Arguments and Their Parodies (Theism, Advanced)
David Lewis
1941–2001Held that possible worlds are as real as this one, differing only in that we are here, and analysed causation counterfactually
- Modal Realism and Ersatzism (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- Theories of Causation (Metaphysics, Intermediate, planned)
- Gunk, Atomless Mereology, and Unrestricted Composition (Metaphysics, Advanced, planned)
- Epistemic Closure and Its Denial (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Safety and Sensitivity Conditions (Epistemology, Intermediate)
- Confirmation Theory, Ravens, and Grue (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Contextualism, Invariantism, and Pragmatic Encroachment (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Formal Epistemology: Probabilism and Updating (Epistemology, Advanced)
- Moral Intuitions and What to Do With Them (Ethics, Beginner)
- Modal Logic: Possible Worlds Semantics (Logic, Intermediate)
- The Normal Systems K, D, T, B, S4, S5 (Logic, Intermediate)
- Conditionals and the Triviality Results (Logic, Advanced)
- Non-Normal Modal Logics (Logic, Advanced)
- Quantified Modal Logic and the Barcan Formulas (Logic, Advanced)
- Relevance Logic and Paraconsistency (Logic, Advanced)
- Temporal, Deontic, and Epistemic Logic (Logic, Advanced)
- Abstract and Concrete (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Causation, First Pass (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Change and Identity Over Time (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Objects and Properties (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Consciousness Versus Cognition (Philosophy of Mind, Beginner)
- Simplicity, Timelessness, and Impassibility (Theism, Advanced)
Derek Parfit
1942–2017Held that personal identity is not what matters in survival, and exposed the repugnant conclusion in population ethics
Daniel Dennett
1942–2024Held that consciousness has no inner theatre, and that qualia as usually described do not exist
Allan Gibbard
1942–Treats normative judgement as the acceptance of norms rather than the description of facts
Marilyn McCord Adams
1943–2017Held that evils which appear to ruin a life must be defeated within that life rather than outweighed by goods distributed anywhere else
- Horrendous Evils and Anti-Theodicy (Theism, Advanced)
- Conditionals and the Triviality Results (Logic, Advanced)
- Probability Logic and Uncertain Premises (Logic, Advanced)
- Divine Attributes and Their Tensions (Theism, Intermediate)
- Moral Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom (Theism, Advanced)
- The Probabilistic Problem of Evil (Theism, Advanced)
- The No-Best-World Problem (Theism, Advanced)
Frank Jackson
1943–Argued with the case of Mary the colour scientist that complete physical knowledge leaves something out, then later withdrew the conclusion
Simon Blackburn
1944–Defends a quasi-realism on which moral talk earns the trappings of truth without moral facts
Peter Singer
1946–Holds that equal interests count equally regardless of species, and that distance does not reduce an obligation to help
Kit Fine
1946–Argued that essence is not reducible to modality, and put grounding at the centre of metaphysics
- Essence Is Not Modality (Metaphysics, Advanced, planned)
- Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation (Metaphysics, Advanced, planned)
- Probability as an Extension of Logic (Logic, Intermediate)
- Conditionals and the Triviality Results (Logic, Advanced)
- Vagueness and the Sorites (Logic, Advanced)
- Essence and Accident (Metaphysics, Beginner)
- Design and Fine-Tuning Arguments (Theism, Intermediate)
- Naturalism and Supernaturalism as Frameworks (Theism, Advanced)
Martha Nussbaum
1947–Specifies a list of central human capabilities a just society must secure to a threshold
Christine Korsgaard
1952–Holds that normativity comes from the agent's own reflective endorsement of what they have reason to do
Judith Butler
1956–Holds that gender is constituted by repeated performance rather than expressing a prior inner fact
David Chalmers
1966–Separated the hard problem of why processing feels like anything from the tractable problems, and takes panpsychism seriously as an answer
- The Hard Problem and the Explanatory Gap (Philosophy of Mind, Advanced, planned)
- Philosophical Zombies and Conceivability (Philosophy of Mind, Intermediate, planned)
- Panpsychism and the Combination Problem (Philosophy of Mind, Advanced, planned)
- The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Quine's Attack (Epistemology, Intermediate)